Mort pour la France: conflict and commemoration in France after the First World War

Article (Unspecified)

'*Mort pour la France*': Conflict and Commemoration in France after the First World War

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The commemoration of wars, battles, and their fallen soldiers pre-dates the First World War in Europe and America. However, the scale of death and the numbers of the dead who were volunteer or conscript soldiers in this war was unprecedented. This fact presented the military and state apparatus of the belligerent nations with an obligation to commemorate, for the first time, *all* of the fallen.

The systematic recording and naming of the dead in military cemeteries and on national and local war memorials was an innovation of this war which, it has been argued, fostered a "democracy of death"[1] among the fallen absent from the commemoration of the dead of previous wars. In France after this war national memorials including the *Ossuaire de Douaumont* at Verdun provided a locus for collective commemoration of the dead. Individually, the list of names of the fallen on local *monuments aux morts* provided a site of mourning for the bereaved that substituted for the absent dead - who were predominantly buried in military battlefield cemeteries or had no known grave.[2]

However, these sites of individual and collective remembrance not only commemorate conflict but their imputed meanings are themselves contested. As Antoine Prost has recorded, a variety of conflictual discourses - civic, republican-patriotic, conservative-patriotic and religious - are implicit in forms of commemoration, which have contested the territory of collective memory. Conflict also existed in the context of local and national claims to the memory of the dead. Daniel Sherman has argued that the discourse of individual loss and grief contained in local memorials was subject to "..recombination with, and appropriation by, more traditional collective narratives."[3]

> *...[S]ince World War 1 European commemoration has embodied a continual struggle between the desire to find meaning as part of some larger collective "history" and the refusal of such histories in an attempt to find meaning at a more local and personal level…The struggle out of which commemoration emerges…involves not simply the appropriate means of honouring the dead or of comforting survivors but the nature of the French polity itself.*[4]

The focus of this essay will be the contested territories of commemoration of the dead of the First World War in France. I will consider the tensions between individual and collective memory in the construction of *monuments aux morts*, local and national interests in burying the dead, and civic and secular discourses in commemorative practice. Verdun as a site of national collective memory and commemoration, and its monuments and mythologies, will provide a particular locus of attention. I will also consider the exclusion of aspects of the experience of the war from commemoration, with specific reference to the 1917 mutinies.

The necessity of commemoration

In the course 1,500 days of 'total war', more than 1,300,000 Frenchmen were killed and likely twice that number wounded.[5] French military deaths were proportionately higher than any other major combatant; according to one estimate 16.8 per cent of those mobilised were killed – some 3.4 per cent of the total population of France.[6] Only Serbia, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria suffered higher rates of casualties. This fact is likely due to the French

High Command's adherence to the doctrine of *offensive`a outrance* maintained until April 1917 when the infantry put an end to the practice by mutinying.[7]

The scale of loss created an even larger army of the bereaved, as Jay Winter records

> *[a]mong the major combatants, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that every family was in mourning: most for a relative – a father, a son, a brother, a husband – others for a friend, a colleague, a lover, a companion.*[8]

The extent of French losses explains the unprecedented scale of commemoration, whilst the state was obliged to commemorate those who had died in the nation's cause, for the bereaved commemoration was an imperative of the mourning process.[9] However, as Sherman argues

> *[t]he proliferation of monuments to the dead of the Great War did not simply result from a spontaneous outpouring of emotion…but involved the fusion of a collective need to mourn with preexisting practices of commemoration.*[10]

Military cemeteries "..for the concentration of individual graves and as places of worship" were, according to George Mosse, a phenomenon originating in the First World War. However, the antecedents of the practice of burying the dead in individual graves had arisen partly because of the sanitary imperative but also from the "quest for equality" during the French revolution.[11] Precedents for the monumental commemoration of fallen soldiers existed, in France, in the *"statuomanie"* of the Third Republic and more recently the commemoration of the Franco-Prussian War. However, as Antoine Prost records monuments to the dead of this war "..were not built in the throes of national mourning but twenty or thirty years later". Their building coincided with the emergence of *revanchist* nationalism and their design often referred to the lost province of Alsace - a preoccupation at the heart of *revanchism*. As such they reflected the views only of those who subscribed to the revanchist creed. The memorials were the work of an association called the Souvenir français, involving neither "..the nation as a whole or its representatives at either the local or national level."[12]

Conflict in commemoration between the local and the national

Commemoration of the dead of the First World War, like death itself, touched everyone's lives; construction of memorials "involved citizens and local as well as national authorities in close cooperation".[13] However, conflict sometimes arose between local self-determination and state intervention. Decisions relating to *monuments aux morts* were made by individual communes, though in October 1919 a law was introduced establishing state subsidies for local memorials, which were administered by the Public Commemoration Division of the Ministry of the Interior. The ministry set up Review commissions at the departmental level as a form of quality control to assess proposed designs for local memorials and to counter "the low aesthetic quality of small-town monuments". Such aesthetically lacking examples were attributed to the "intervention of commerce and entrepreneurship" of the industry that had sprung up in response to demand in the wake of war.[14] Whilst commissions took issue with memorials they viewed as mass-produced "commercial junk" many small towns and villages lacked the resources to commission original pieces of art as their memorials and manufacturers provided for this market. However, in response to review commissions' criticisms local officials often showed "..surprising confidence in their own ability to determine the type of monument appropriate to their community". As Sherman argues

> *...the dichotomy between art and commerce, or between high and popular art, clearly constituted one of the basic divisions between the state and localities*[15]

A further area of conflict between the local and the national, which emerged in the aftermath of the war, was the debate over where the dead should be buried. Burial of the dead during the war was often less than systematic; much of the work undertaken by the various combatant's burial services to bring some order, through the construction of proper military cemeteries, was undermined by the huge shifts in the front after the German Spring Offensive in 1918. To add to this chaos there were many isolated, scattered and unidentified burials and of many thousands of the dead there was no trace.

> *The sheer chaos of the devastated areas led many bereaved people to call for governments to let them bring their dead home, back to their villages where they could be interred in local cemeteries.*[16]

The British ruled out repatriating their dead because of expense and prohibited individuals bringing bodies home for reasons of equality. The Americans had promised to bring home their dead if requested and 70 percent were repatriated.[17] Conversely Germany was "in no position" to exhume its dead from the areas it had occupied.[18] However, the fact that the majority of the French dead had fallen on, and were buried in, their home soil raised other issues. Impatience grew at the lengthy process of identifying and regrouping the dead and such disquiet, combined with the Ministry of the Interior's uniform refusal of individual requests by bereaved relatives to exhume and bring home the bodies of their loved ones, led to a rash of clandestine exhumations. Entrepreneurial contractors were often hired by the bereaved to conduct these illegal exhumations.[19]

In an attempt to control this situation a Commission on Military Cemeteries was created with the object of consolidating military cemeteries.

> *While this process was under way, for a period of three years, no private exhumations and reburials were to be allowed. This decision did not end the matter. It simply intensified a long and at times acrimonious debate about the appropriate resting place for the fallen.*[20]

Opinion was divided. Many believed that the dead should be 'demobilised' whilst others argued that they should be buried where they had fallen, alongside their comrades in military cemeteries, a symbol of their sacrifice for *patrie*. Indeed, George Mosse has argued that in the inter-war period military cemeteries became the focus of a nationalistic cult of the fallen soldier.[21] According to Sherman, self interest was also a factor even though "..both sides justified their positions in terms of the presumed wishes of the soldiers themselves".[22] Those living in the regions devastated during the war feared that removing the dead from the battlefields would draw the nation's attention and resources away from their own plight. However, in other regions

> *...the families of the dead, and the local officials they elected, felt keenly not only the absence of the dead but the lack of a place where they could mourn them.*[23]

In September 1920 the authorities gave in to popular pressure - and the continued illegal exhumations - and allowed the bereaved to claim the bodies of their dead, 300,000 did so constituting 40 per cent of the identified dead.[24] This leaves some 1,000,000 dead, 600,000 of whom are unidentified, buried in military cemeteries, interred in ossuaries or simply missing. In the absence of bodies the lists of names on local war memorials, according to Sherman, "literally *embody* a discourse of commemoration centered on grief and individual loss". However, though lists of names inscribed on memorials may lack meaning beyond those imputed by individual mourners it is this resonance which "..enhances their value as commemorative signifiers". As Sherman argues, individual meanings brought to the

names on memorials might be appropriated into the collective discourses of public commemoration through recombination with "more traditional collective narratives" represented in memorial design and public ceremonies.

> *Most local monuments combine lists of names with a sculptural or architectural motif, typically a statue of a common soldier or a simple stele or obelisk, thus conjoining the collective and the individual dimensions of commemoration*[25]

Monuments aux morts and meaning

In his essay 'Monuments to the Dead', Antoine Prost surveys both the range of meanings that are brought to *monuments aux morts* through ceremonial acts of commemoration and the implicit meanings located in memorials' design.[26] He presents a typology of memorials with three sets of signifiers - physical location, presence or absence of statuary, and inscriptions. A monument's situation in front of the church or the *mairie* could be interpreted as signifying adherence to either religious or civic discourses. Statuary might signify victory, sacrifice, grief, resistance, peace, revenge, patriotism, anti-militarism or various combinations of the same depending on the figures incorporated and whether their representation is realistic, idealistic or allegorical. Inscriptions might speak the language of the Republic, less frequently of patriotism, and occasionally of anti-militarism. The meanings inherent in the combination of site, nature of statuary, and inscription could thus be semiologically decoded. Prost's typology identifies four main groups of monument

> *..civic monuments, the most common and the most secular, and fully republican; patriotic-republican monuments, which often celebrate victory as well as sacrifice…funerary-patriotic monuments which glorify sacrifice; and purely funerary monuments, which emphasize the depth of grief without offering any justification for it and thus tend toward pacifism*[27]

Armistice Day ceremonies conducted at local memorials in the inter-war period were neither official nor military but funerary in nature. The names of the dead on the monument, which, according to Sherman, represented a commune's "..loss as its most essential link to the nation",[28] were read out. A flag or flags, representing the nation, and various groups such as veterans associations, were brought before the monument and dipped during the minute of silence; thus the Republic honoured the sacrifice of its citizens. These ceremonies and accompanying speeches also constituted a form of civic pedagogy in which the fundamental values of the Republic were inculcated; hence the importance ascribed to the attendance of schoolchildren.[29]

The predominance of 'civic-republican' monuments combined with the nature of the ceremonies that were enacted before them comprised what Prost describes as the "republican cult of the war dead". Because of the schism between church and state this secular cult performed the role of fostering faith in the Republic, a role that nonetheless co-opted the still familiar customs of Catholicism into the "distinctive ritual" of what constituted a "civil religion".[30] Listing the names of the dead on monuments and reading them out in ceremonial speeches was also a means of inferring that "..the Republic was nothing but its citizens." However, David Troyansky wonders if the extent of "..uniformity of the monuments" was less the manifestation of a civic religion and more "..a function of mass production and a desire to avoid controversy."[31] Furthermore, in contrast to Prost's account of a collectively subscribed-to civic religion, Troyansky records that the inauguration of the Saint-Quentin *monument aux morts* was marked by demonstrations of conflicting political interests.[32]

In his local study of Saint-Quentin Troyansky shows how local monuments to the First World War, by 'referring' to memorials commemorating previous traumas, might imply

historical continuity and fuse local memory with national history.[33] A sculptural device that embodied the link between the local and the national was that of the poilu.

> *[T]he special appeal of the poilu lay in his ability to conjoin national with local resonances. Not only a standard figure, he was also a local one; given local roots by the names at his feet, he stood not only for the nation but for the individuals a particular community had given up in its name.*[34]

The poilus' status as 'citizen-soldiers' also located such memorials in a republican historical continuity. Such continuity is referred to directly in a memorial on the Chemin des Dames in the Aisne; a 1914 poilu and an 1814 *grognard* are united in holding the Tricolore (fig.1). The choice of location for this memorial undoubtedly owes something to the fact that battles were fought here in 1814 and 1914. However the poilus' 'citizen-soldier' status was asserted here during the 1917 mutinies when, as Leonard Smith argues, the mutinying infantry negotiated with the army command structure during what was in effect a 'strike' over appalling conditions.[35] Perhaps this provides a more compelling reason for such affirming representations of continuity. Those *Revanchist* monuments to the Franco-Prussian War that employed the device of a woman in traditional Alsatian costume also invoked continuity in the cause of national integrity (fig.2). However, Sherman goes further arguing that many local monuments to the First World War, and that which they signify, have become invisible, fading with memory.[36]

Verdun, national monument

> *Les grandes batailles demeurent dans la mémoire des peuples, et d'abord celles où s'affirme l'identité nationale dans la volonté d'arrêter un aggresseur.*[37]

The Battle of Verdun fought between the French and the Germans during February and November 1916 was, according to Alistair Horne, one of the "grimmest" military contests in history.[38] Some 700,000 casualties were suffered before France could claim its Pyrrhic victory there.[39] Even whilst the battle was being fought it became a national symbol. This was in part due to the sheer scale of the fighting; partly the historic and symbolic importance attached to Verdun; and also because Pétain's 'noria' system of troop rotation, which meant that some seventy per cent of the French armies saw service there, ensured many witnesses to its infamy.[40]

> *Avant d'être vécue, la bataille avait été imaginée, et l'expérience nourrissait à son tour l'imaginaire collectif. Verdun devenait ainsi un lieu sacré: lieu de sacrifice et de consécration.*[41]

However, Antoine Prost argues that two simultaneous and conflictual *"mémoires collectives de Verdun"* flourished around this symbol.

> *[Une] Mémoire de la nation tout entière, structurée par la presse, les autorités publiques, les notables locaux et les conversations quotidiennes; mémoire nationale aussi, résonnante de fierté patriotique. À côté de cette mémoire, et liée à elle parlent lettres du front ou les récits incomplets et pudiques des permissionaires, une mémoire combattante, plus étroite, plus dense, plus forte, à la fierté plus intime, chargée d'émotions, d'angoisses, de deuils: celle des soldats qui ont "fait" Verdun.*[42]

However, it was predominantly the former *mémoire collective* that informed the process of commemorating the battle. According to Prost this was partly due to the fact that the weight of public collective memory was stronger than that of the soldiers because non-combatants were more numerous. Furthermore, the process of commemoration was engaged whilst the soldiers were still at the front fighting, and in the aftermath of war veterans were

too dispersed and too involved in resuming their civilian lives to raise a significant voice in the proceedings. Veterans were probably hesitant to refuse conventional homage even if efforts at commemoration had the false ring of the heroic and patriotic.[43]

The pre-eminent example of such memorialisation at Verdun is the *Tranchée des Baionettes*, a monument that both reflects and informs the legend it is, literally, built upon. According to the legend, on the 12th June 1916 sixty men from one company had stayed at their posts, with bayonets fixed, resisting an overwhelming enemy attack and were buried alive by bombardment. They were subsequently discovered buried beneath their bayonets, which protruded above ground.[44] However, the bayonet is used in attack not defence and artillery shells do not collapse trenches.[45] A more likely explanation is that they were buried in a section of trench and their graves marked with bayonets by the German troops who captured the sector. This site became the stuff of myth, a powerful symbol of "..the indomitable will of the French army not to be broken at Verdun."[46]

> *Avec la baionette, vont l'héroisme de pacotille, le faux courage et le faux sublime de soldats qu'on voudrait impatients de donner l'assaut vibrants de patriotisme et mourant joyeux.*[47]

It was decided that the trench itself should be preserved as a monument, and an American banker, George F. Rand, donated 500,000 franc to this end. The finished monument is an imposing minimalist concrete mausoleum, which encases and protects the trench, its occupants, and the protruding bayonets from the erosion of time and the elements. What actually happened to the men who are interred here is unknown, yet their bodies have been appropriated into a heroic-patriotic legend the monumental commemoration of which literally gives weight to the myth. According to a guide-book to the monument

> *..l'énorme dalle a l'air de se soulever comme la pierre d'un tombeau. Elle traduit bien l'impression ressentie par chacun. On s'y sent comme écrasé par la présence d'un souvenir héroique entre tous!*[48]

Another site of the appropriation of commemoration at Verdun is that of the *Ossuaire de Douaumont* into a religious discourse of sacrifice. With the outbreak of war, the Roman Catholic church saw a "return to the altars" once more after a marked decrease in attendance since the separation of state and church. The church seized the opportunity to embrace the national cause with the aim of becoming "..reintegrated into the nation..[to]..escape their position as pariahs since 1905."[49] Nonetheless, despite its wartime efforts church attendance resumed its decline in the aftermath of the war. Four years of conflict had undermined morale and confidence in those institutions that had supported the war effort. Furthermore, the advent of a centre-left government in 1924 saw the resumption of hostilities between state and church. However, Prost records that the Church, although marginalised by the state, played a great role in the transformation of Verdun into a site of memory "..la religion n'avait de place reconnue que dans le culte des morts". The church invested much effort in the work of commemoration particularly the creation of four major battlefield ossuaries, which house the remains of many of the unidentified dead. The Church's influence is evident in the design of Verdun's ossuary; its tower is in the shape of an artillery shell with four crosses linked around its circumference, inferring a sacrificial discourse of martyrdom by shellfire; and a chapel adjoins the memorial hall and repository. The Church also played a high profile role in commemorative events at the ossuary where the themes of sacrifice, salvation, and forgiveness were prominent in religious services.[50]

The Christian symbolism of the *Ossuaire de Douaumont* is apparent, if muted in comparison with that of the ossuary at *Notre Dame de Lorette*, which

> *..with its hulking Romanesque basilica and cruciform tower, presents an unabashedly Catholic vision of death and resurrection, implicitly blaming the war on the sins of a secular republic.*[51]

However, such an ostentatiously religious discourse of commemoration could not go unchallenged by the forces of secular republicanism. According to Sherman, by acknowledging the co-existence of non-religious discourse and adopting a less overt claim on commemorative practice, "..the church could assure itself a dominant role in post-war commemoration."[52]

Verdun and collective memory

As living memory of the First World War fades a mythologised, culturally negotiated version of events has taken its place in the collective memory. Individual recollection is replaced by the dominant narratives of collective memory that are distilled over time into popular mythologies which, through simplification, help us to make sense of the chaos of the past.[53] "Collective remembrance is public recollection. It is the act of gathering bits and pieces of the past, and joining them together in public. The 'public' is the group that produces, expresses and consumes it. What they create is not a cluster of individual memories; the whole is greater than the sum of the parts"[54]

In this sense *monuments aux morts* and other sites of commemoration of the First World war have become what Pierre Nora's eponymous project describes as *Les lieux de mémoire*, or sites of memory. The definition of a *lieu de mémoire* which informs Nora's *"histoire de France par la mémoire"* comprises a

> *..meaningful entity of a real or imagined kind, which has become a symbolic element of a given community as a result of human will or the effect of time.*[55]

Today Verdun's status as a national *lieu de mémoire* is apparent; its thirty square kilometres of battlefields still bristle with symbolism. Much of the devastated terrain was reforested after the war and remains so, except for the carefully landscaped swathes of ground around its cemeteries and numerous monuments, which are maintained for the seasonal stream of tourists and pilgrims. Verdun is an eminent site of battlefield tourism - a growth area, which now constitutes "..the largest single category of tourist attractions in the world."[56]

However, the meanings today's visitor to Verdun will impute from this landscape of commemoration draw from a collective memory that has evolved over time. As Antoine Prost records, the nature of books, films, and other forms of cultural production on the subject of the Battle of Verdun gradually changed throughout the inter-war period, the patriotic narrative of *l'héroisme* became one of steadfast *tenir*. After a long silence in the aftermath of the Second World War, new histories of Verdun that emerged in the sixties were more distanced and objective.[57] Similarly, the symbolic content of commemoration also changed over time. The ceremony marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Verdun, held at the *Ossuaire de Douaumont*, was also used to mark a transition in its symbolic meaning. According to the speech given by Verdun's *Député-Maire*

> *En 1916, Verdun a été l'image de la Gloire. En 1966, Verdun doit être le symbole de la paix.*[58]

The celebration of patriotism and victory that had constituted *la Gloire* made way for the cause of peace and forward vision, and then in 1984 Franco-German reconciliation was officially consecrated in a ceremony also held at the *Ossuaire*. As Prost has argued, the ceremonies that "unfolded" around monuments have "..invested them with a significance they did not originally possess."[59] Collective memory is informed by the dominant narratives

of a given period, the ascendance of particular narratives derives from the privileging of certain aspects of experience and the exclusion of others, and such partiality is generally informed by the exigencies of the political and social climate of the period.

Commemoration and exclusion

During the First World War museums were created in Britain, Germany and France with the dual object of collating documents, images, and artefacts for posterity and also to inform and promulgate support for the national cause from the civil population. However, in its aftermath these museums' purpose was to "..design the memory of the war",[60] or rather a selective version of the same. Verdun, like the Somme and Ypres has become part of that which Susanne Brandt has described as an open-air museum of the Western Front,[61] and that which is represented in this landscape of commemoration is also selective. Daniel Sherman has argued that a function of commemoration is the restoration of "..the socio-cultural order that the commemorated event has disrupted."[62] This necessarily involves suppression of the memory of experiences that have threatened that order.

> *[C]ommemoration privileges certain kinds of experience and excludes others: it deploys not only memory but forgetting.*[63]

Sherman has located such exclusion in the context of the representation of 'traditional' gender roles in monumental and other forms of commemoration. Female figures on *monuments aux morts* were usually either allegories for victory or the nation, or grieving wives and mothers often accompanied by children. The privileging of representations of female domesticity marginalised women's experience of independence, particularly that gained in the workplace, "..commemoration served to reinscribe gender codes that World War 1 had disrupted in France."[64]

Commemoration also subsumed individual death into a narrative of sacrifice for the collective, which excluded the reality of compulsory service and, in the case of the 1917 mutinies, conflict within the army command structure. Official archives give the figures of 3,427 soldiers convicted of offences relating to the mutinies, some 554 receiving death sentences of which 49 were executed.[65] However, these figures have been contested by historians of the mutinies.

> *..executions involved in the suppression of revolt could be covered up by listing the death under some category other than execution, such as 'died of wounds' or 'killed in an accident.*[66]

Whatever the actual figure the names of those who were executed for mutiny were not elided from the lists of names on *monuments aux morts*, their inclusion excludes the mutinies from history and commemoration.

Conclusion

The meanings signified in France's landscape of memorials and cemeteries of the First World War were contested while the war was still being fought, and, in certain cases, has been ever since. Conflict in commemoration has occurred on various levels; between individual and collective meaning, local and national interests, the state and the Church, discourses of the secular and the sacred, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain experiences.

The lists of names on local monuments symbolised individual grief and loss, but the reconfiguration of individual meaning through the monumental and ritual commemorations of memorial and ceremony appropriated individual commemoration and the individual dead into the collective narratives and commemorative practices of state and church. Whilst many

families fought for the return of their dead others believed they should remain in military cemeteries as a symbol of the sacrifice in defence of *patrie*.

National monuments, like those at Verdun, became sites of national memory, and collective memory was reflected in the ceremonies and cultural production that commemorated the battle there. However, the meanings imputed in these monuments have changed over time, and as the dominant narratives of collective memory evolve, so also do the meanings individuals bring to monuments and commemoration.

Commemorative practice sought to restore the pre-war socio-cultural order, stressing continuity and national unity by emphasising certain experiences to the exclusion of others. One area of experience, which has been excluded from commemoration of the First World War in France, has once again become the subject of conflict.

The publication of Guy Pedroncini's innovative *Les Mutineries de 1917* in 1967 transformed the historiography of the mutinies. Based on archival evidence, including the military justice records, which had been closed for fifty years, this account brought debate about the mutinies, their causes and the fate of those *"fusillés pour l'exemple"*, into the public sphere in France. Opinion, around what continues to be an emotive issue for the French people, appears to remain divided. On November 5th 1998 at Craonne on the Chemin des Dames, Lionel Jospin the Socialist Prime minister expressed the wish that the soldiers "shot for the example" would, today, be "fully reintegrated in our national collective memory".[67] However, echoing the sentiments of the conservative establishment, President of the Republic Jacques Chirac responded that:

> *At the moment when the nation commemorates more than a million French soldiers who gave their lives between 1914 and 1918 in defence of their country, the Elysée finds inopportune any public declaration which could be construed as the rehabilitation of the mutineers.*[68]

The memory of the 1917 mutineers is still an area of conflict; their place in the national collective memory remains contested. Perhaps, eventually their names will be commemorated on a monument which records their fate.

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13. Ibid, p.308.
14. Sherman, 'Art, Commerce, and the Production of Memory', p.194.

15. Ibid, pp.194-.198.
16. Winter, *Sites of Memory Sites of Mourning*, p.23.
17. Laqueur, 'Memory and Naming in the Great War', p.162.
18. Winter, *Sites of Memory*, p.27.
19. Sherman, 'Bodies and Names', p.451. See also Bertrand Tavernier's film *La Vie et Rien d'Autre* (1989), which is set in the aftermath of the war in the context of the task to find and identify the dead, and the 'business' of commemoration. Two women searching for the 'missing' man they both loved come to terms with their loss only after his body is found.
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21. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, (Oxford,1990), pp.70-.106.
22. Sherman, 'Bodies and Names', p.451
23. Ibid, p.451.
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25. Sherman, 'Bodies and Names', p.447.
26. Prost, 'Monuments to the Dead', pp.306-.330.
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28. Sherman, 'Art, Commerce and the Production of Memory', pp.206-.207.
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